Response to the SpaceX ex parte communication to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission regarding its 1 million orbital data centers application

September 22, 2026

Before the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20554

via ICFS Electronic Filing

In the Matter of: Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, Application for Authorization to Launch and Operate the Starmind Non-Geostationary Orbit Space Station System (ICFS File No. SAT-LOA-20260108-00016)

RESPONSE TO EX PARTE PRESENTATION AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR SPACE ENVIRONMENTALISM

SUMMARY OF THE FILING

Pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 1.49(c), the Center for Space Environmentalism (CSE) submits this summary of its Supplemental Comments in response to the Ex Parte presentation filed by Space Exploration Holdings, LLC (“SpaceX”) on September 16, 2026, regarding its Starmind Non-Geostationary Orbit Space Station System (ICFS File No. SAT-LOA-20260108-00016). It consists of the following arguments:

1. The proposed non-GSO Space Station System involves an unprecedented mass scale that will result in significant atmospheric pollution. SpaceX’s disclosure that each Starmind orbital data center satellite will have a mass of up to 4,000 kg with a 1,500 m2 solar array indicates a total constellation mass of 4,000,000 metric tons. Under the Commission’s five-year post-mission disposal lifecycle, maintaining a 1,000,000-satellite fleet requires demising roughly 200,000 satellites annually, therefore vaporizing 800,000 metric tons of spacecraft mass in the upper atmosphere every year. This massive and regular injection of aluminum oxide (Al2O3) nanoparticles directly threatens stratospheric ozone layer recovery and alters Earth’s atmospheric radiative balance.

2. SpaceX’s debris models are flawed and their application ignores demonstrated reentry hazards. SpaceX’s claim of zero ground casualty risk relies on theoretical computer simulations (DRAMA/3Demise) assuming ideal demise under a 15-Joule kinetic impact threshold. This model ignores real-world ground truth in which Starlink hardware modeled as “100% demisable” has repeatedly survived reentry and impacted land in North Carolina, Saskatchewan, Poland, and Mexico. Furthermore, SpaceX’s proposed 60-day targeted ocean deorbit plan assumes 100% propulsion reliability. Even a minor, 0.1% control failure rate across a 1,000,000-satellite fleet would leave 1,000 unmanaged, 4-tonne objects tumbling out of control in Low Earth Orbit (LEO).

3. SpaceX is engaging in regulatory evasion and makes impermissible selective jurisdiction claims. SpaceX attempts to withhold critical technical data regarding its petabit optical inter-satellite link (OISL) mesh by asserting the Commission lacks jurisdiction over optical communications. The Commission cannot selectively invoke broad ancillary authority under Sections 4(i) and 303(r) to regulate non-radiofrequency space debris while disclaiming authority over non-radiofrequency laser networks, optical sky pollution, and mesh architectures. Under the Communications Act and NEPA, the Commission has a non-delegable duty to evaluate the safety and environmental impacts of the complete space station system prior to authorization.

4. Starmind represents a significant Kessler Syndrome risk and exposes the vulnerability associated with untracked debris. Per-satellite collision risk metrics present a statistical mirage that hides extreme density in narrow 50 km altitude shells, where 1,000,000 satellites present an aggregate target cross-section of 1,500 km2. Under the NASA Standard Satellite Breakup Model, a single hypervelocity collision involving a 4,000-kg satellite generates over 132,000 lethal fragments ≥1 cm in size. Because ground-based surveillance networks cannot track or generate conjunction alerts for sub-10 cm debris, automated collision avoidance systems are physically incapable of dodging these lethal fragments. This will result in a severe collision cascade risk (i.e., the ‘Kessler Syndrome)’.

5. The Commission should take certain actions in response. The Commission must: (1) deny SpaceX’s requests for regulatory waivers regarding milestone requirements, surety bonds, and detailed technical filings; (2) mandate a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA to evaluate upper-atmosphere ablation pollution, stratospheric ozone depletion, night sky brightness increase, and aggregate collision risks; and (3) defer authorization until SpaceX submits complete, publicly accessible technical specifications for its optical link infrastructure, collision avoidance protocols, and empirically verified demise testing.

The Center for Space Environmentalism (CSE) respectfully submits these Supplemental Comments in response to the Ex Parte communication filed by Space Exploration Holdings, LLC (hereinafter “SpaceX”) on September 16, 2026.1 Pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206, interest groups and the public are entitled to review and respond to ex parte submissions in ‘permit-but-disclose’ proceedings to ensure a complete, accurate, and transparent administrative record.

The disclosures provided in SpaceX’s September 16 filing, prompted only by a formal deficiency inquiry from the Space Bureau,2 reveal unprecedented physical scale and environmental risk. Rather than resolving the fundamental concerns raised in CSE’s initial Comment3 and Reply Comment,4 SpaceX’s reliance on computer simulations, narrow jurisdiction arguments, and best-case operational assumptions reinforces the necessity of denying the requested waivers and ordering a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).5

I. The “4-tonne” Reality: Massive Atmospheric Ablation and Climate Risks

SpaceX’s filing reveals for the first time that each Starmind orbital data center satellite will weigh up to 4,000 kg (4 metric tons) with a solar array area exceeding 1,500 square meters.6 For comparison, low-Earth orbit (LEO) broadband satellites typically weigh between 300 kg and 1,250 kg.7 Authorizing 1,000,000 satellites at 4,000 kg each introduces 4,000,000 metric tons (4 megatons) of artificial hardware into LEO, which will eventually end up either in the atmosphere as vapor or on the ground as a significant casualty risk.

Under the Commission’s mandatory 5-year post-mission disposal rule,8 replacing a 1,000,000-satellite constellation requires launching, deorbiting, and demising approximately 200,000 satellites per year, which is on average one satellite every three minutes. This results in the intentional vaporization of 800,000 metric tons of spacecraft mass in the upper atmosphere every year, an atmospheric material injection rate with severe implications for stratospheric chemistry9 and ozone depletion.10 SpaceX asserts that complete atmospheric “demise” eliminates risk because components do not reach the ground.11 However, “demising” a 4-tonne spacecraft does not destroy its matter; rather, it vaporizes metallic alloys into submicron aluminum oxide (Al2O3) nanoparticles and metallic dust directly within the mesosphere and stratosphere.12 Peer-reviewed atmospheric research confirms that satellite reentry ablation produces aluminum oxides that catalyze chlorine activation,13 directly depleting the protective ozone layer and altering atmospheric radiative balance. Furthermore, maintaining SpaceX’s planned deployment schedule demands approximately 20 Starship launches per day, injecting unprecedented volumes of black carbon soot and nitrogen oxides directly into the middle and upper atmosphere. The SpaceX proposal therefore represents a vast and ongoing atmospheric pollution event which could destroy the ozone layer14 that is just now starting to recover, decades after the successful 1987 Montreal Protocol.

II. Failure of Debris Models and Uncontrolled Reentry Risks

SpaceX claims its aggregate human casualty risk is zero because computer modeling indicates no surviving fragment will impact the Earth with kinetic energy exceeding 15 Joules.15 This claim suffers from severe real-world and statistical deficiencies, in addition to being impossible to verify independently. SpaceX relies on NASA Debris Assessment Software (DAS) and internal heat-transfer models.16 However, SpaceX Starlink hardware modeled as “100% demisable” has repeatedly survived atmospheric reentry, impacting land in Australia,17 North Carolina,18 Saskatchewan (twice),19 Poland,20 and Mexico,21 among other locations.22 DAS is calibrated for 1980s and 1990s spacecraft, which were made of very different materials than modern spacecraft and satellites, and do not do a good job of predicting satellite demisability today23. These software simulations have failed to predict real-world survivability for lighter satellites; relying on them for 4,000-kg satellites containing dense computing nodes, power processing units, and high-capacity heat sinks is reckless and unrealistic. More specifically, the company implies in this claim that its choice of materials (like aluminum over titanium) ensures that 100% of objects surviving atmospheric re-entry will disintegrate into objects under about 2 cm in size before hitting the troposphere.24

However, the extensive use of multi-layered carbon fibre appears to shred and significantly slow down spacecraft pieces before they demise (as one of the authors of this comment was able to inspect in person for a recent SpaceX debris fall). If SpaceX’s engineering assumptions are wrong and a component like a structural bracket or battery frame survives reentry intact, it will easily violate the FCC safety guidelines.25 That was clearly the case with the Dragon trunk incident in Canada as well as for other apparent finds of intact SpaceX debris.

Demisability models such as NASA's DAS have a history of being wrong. NASA itself openly admitted after these incidents that their initial simulations predicted the Dragon trunks would “burn up fully,”26 which did not happen. While the materials of a spacecraft bus (e.g., aluminum) make it inherently more likely to disintegrate than a Dragon trunk (carbon-fiber composite), no atmospheric demise model is 100% accurate.

The real-world survival of the Dragon trunk pieces is concrete proof that “predicted to burn up fully” is often a legal and mathematical best-case scenario rather than a guaranteed physical outcome. A recent New York Times article about reentering space debris recently noted that “The company [SpaceX] now says that about 5 percent of the mass of some satellites may not disintegrate.”27 5% of one million 4-tonne satellites is an obscenely high risk for people, aircraft, and even livestock on the ground.

SpaceX’s plan to perform targeted ocean deorbiting within 60 days depends entirely on 100% propulsion and attitude control reliability.28 The company has claimed that Starlink satellites will use “semi-controlled reentries” to aim for the Pacific Ocean29 after a much greater than 15J Starlink piece was discovered on a farm in Saskatchewan in 2024. However, historical Starlink reentry data30 as plotted in Figure 1 does not confidently demonstrate that Starlink is managing to primarily reenter over the Pacific Ocean. Across a fleet of 1,000,000 satellites, even a standard 0.1% control failure rate (99.9% reliability) will yield 1,000 unmanaged, 4-tonne derelict satellites. These uncommanded objects will undergo chaotic, uncontrolled reentries, creating severe kinetic hazards for populated landmasses and commercial aviation corridors.

Figure 1: Latitude and longitude of Starlink reentries from TIPS data catalogued by J. McDowell. Color indicates year of reentry. While there is a slight clustering of the red and dark red (2025 and 2026 reentries) over the general area of the south Pacific Ocean, the majority of reentries in the last two years did not happen in the claimed target area.

III. Untested Optical Mesh Architecture and Regulatory Evasion

In the ex parte communication, SpaceX attempts to bypass Commission scrutiny of its primary communications link, a petabit-scale optical inter-satellite link (OISL) mesh, by asserting that laser communications fall outside the FCC's statutory jurisdiction.31 We argue that the Commission cannot lawfully invoke broad “ancillary jurisdiction” under Section 4(i) of the Communications Act32 selectively to regulate non-spectrum space operations like orbital debris, satellite reentries and hardware design while simultaneously disclaiming any authority or obligation to evaluate the optical interconnectivity, brightness, and atmospheric impacts of those same satellites.

To be clear, SpaceX is not asking for an isolated laser spectrum permit. Rather, it is applying for a Part 25 Space Station Authorization for 1,000,000 satellites. Under 47 U.S.C. § 309, the Commission must evaluate the entire space station system to determine whether granting the authorization serves the public interest, convenience and necessity. Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the Commission acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it cherry-picks which non-spectrum operational features it chooses to scrutinize.33 If the Commission accepts SpaceX’s logic, it will establish a dangerous precedent in which operators can bypass environmental, optical, and safety review simply by routing primary command and data architectures through lasers.

SpaceX asks the Commission to grant market access and orbital authority for 1,000,000 massive satellites while actively withholding technical data regarding the optical payload that binds the constellation together. Operating an interconnected optical mesh of 1,000,000 units requires precise line-of-sight tracking. To maintain optical cross-links without beam degradation, SpaceX may be forced to remove or modify anti-reflective visors and brightness-mitigation coatings.34 Combined with 1,500 m² solar arrays on each satellite, this constellation will elevate diffuse sky brightness, inducing a state of permanent “artificial twilight” that degrades optical and infrared astronomical research globally.35

The Communications Act nowhere explicitly mentions “orbital debris,” “space sustainability,” “kinetic ground impact” or similar phrases, yet the Commission regulates these non-radiofrequency issues by asserting ancillary authority under Sections 4(i) and 303(r). In doing so it argues they are necessary to protect the public interest and ensure safe spectrum operations. Yet it is simple administrative double-dealing to claim full authority over non-RF debris while claiming zero authority over non-RF optical operations.

The Commission cannot have it both ways. It cannot assert expansive ancillary jurisdiction over physical satellite hardware and orbital debris while turning a blind eye to the optical inter-satellite links, visual pollution of the night sky, and the operational mesh architectures that define the Starmind system. Despite its repeated claims to the contrary, it has a non-delegable duty under the Communications Act and NEPA to evaluate the environmental, optical, and safety impacts of the complete space station system before granting operational clearance.

IV. Aggregate Orbital Density and Kessler Syndrome

SpaceX asserts in the ex parte communication that its single-satellite collision probability complies with the Commission’s 0.001 (1-in-1,000) threshold, reporting passive decay figures ranging between 4.62×10-5 and 1.37×10-4 across its operational shells,36 and that it relies on automated collision avoidance maneuvers to further reduce real-world risk.37 SpaceX's reliance on broad volume averages, claiming its satellites occupy only “0.005% of space”, is a deliberate misrepresentation of orbital dynamics.38 Multiplying the solar array footprint of up to 1,500 m² by 1,000,000 satellites yields a combined surface area of 1.5 billion square meters (1.5×103 km2, larger than the entire surface area within the corporate boundaries of the city of Los Angeles, California concentrated within narrow 50 km orbital altitude bands, creating localized traffic bottlenecks where real-world collision risks far exceed broad statistical averages.

Deploying 4,000 kg satellites into narrow orbital shells creates an extreme collision cascade hazard. Applying the NASA Standard Satellite Breakup Model, a single catastrophic hypervelocity collision involving a 4,000 kg spacecraft generates over 132,000 lethal fragments ≥ 1 cm and over 430,000 fragments ≥ 5 mm. Because objects smaller than 10 cm cannot be tracked or dodged via conjunction alerts, this cloud of sub-trackable shrapnel would transit the shell for decades, threatening adjacent spacecraft and risking a localized collision cascade (i.e., Kessler Syndrome) that could render critical LEO shells unusable for generations.

Automated collision avoidance cannot protect satellites from untracked debris (< 10 cm).39 Because space surveillance networks cannot reliably catalog or generate predictive ephemerides for sub-10 cm fragments, no conjunction data messages (CDMs) are generated to trigger autonomous thruster maneuvers.40 As a result, deploying 1,000,000 satellites with massive surface footprints creates an enormous target area for untracked, lethal debris that automated systems are physically incapable of dodging.41

A recent scientific paper by Hugh Lewis demonstrates that even ignoring every other satellite and piece of debris in orbit, assuming perfect collision avoidance operations, and assuming the smallest possible collision cross sections, the proposed SpaceX system is above the runaway collision threshold and would cause Kessler Syndrome42. This means that this system as proposed is physically impossible to operate safely.

V. Conclusion and Requested Commission Actions

SpaceX’s Ex Parte disclosure confirms that the Starmind project represents an unprecedented industrialization of LEO with massive environmental and orbital safety consequences. The Commission must not treat 4-tonne orbital data centers as routine telecommunications satellites. The Center for Space Environmentalism therefore respectfully requests that the Commission:

1. Deny SpaceX's request for waivers regarding milestone requirements, surety bonds, and detailed technical filings;

2. Order a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA to evaluate upper-atmosphere ablation pollution, stratospheric ozone depletion, diffuse sky brightness, and aggregate collision risks; and

3. Deny authorization until SpaceX submits complete, publicly accessible technical specifications for its optical link infrastructure, collision avoidance systems, and verified physical demise testing.

1 Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, Ex Parte Response regarding Starmind Non-Geostationary Orbit Space Station System, ICFS File No. SAT-LOA-20260108-00016 (filed Sept. 16, 2026).

2 Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 1. ee also Federal Communications Commission, Space Bureau, Inquiry Letter to SpaceX regarding ICFS File No. SAT-LOA-20260108-00016 (Aug. 28, 2026; extension granted Sept. 11, 2026).

3 Center for Space Environmentalism, Comments in the Matter of Space Exploration Holdings, LLC Starmind Application, ICFS File No. SAT-LOA-20260108-00016 (filed Mar. 4, 2026).

4 Center for Space Environmentalism, Reply Comments in the Matter of Space Exploration Holdings, LLC Starmind Application, ICFS File No. SAT-LOA-20260108-00016 (filed Mar. 23, 2026).

5 47 C.F.R. § 1.1307.

6 Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 8 (Q. 10(d)).

7 See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20200417-00037, Attachment A (Technical Information) & Orbital Debris Assessment Report at 2–3 (filed Apr. 17, 2020) (disclosing ~260–306 kg mass for Starlink v1.0/v1.5 satellites); Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-AMD-20210818-00105, Technical Attachment & Orbital Debris Assessment Report at 2–4 (filed Aug. 18, 2021) (specifying ~800 kg bus mass for Starlink V2 Mini and up to ~1,250 kg mass for full-size Gen2 satellites); Kuiper Systems LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20190704-00057, Attachment A (Technical Information) & Orbital Debris Assessment Report at 3–5 (filed July 4, 2019) (disclosing design parameters for Kuiper LEO satellites in the 600–750 kg range); Jonathan C. McDowell, The Low Earth Orbit Satellite Population and Impacts of the SpaceX Starlink Constellation, 892 Astrophys. J. Lett. L36, L36–L38 (2020) http://doi.org/10.3847/2041-8213/ab8016 (analyzing mass distribution and cross-sectional parameters of LEO constellations); Jonathan C. McDowell, General Catalog of Artificial Space Objects, Planet4589.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2026), https://planet4589.org/space/gcat/.

8 Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order FCC 22-74: Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age (5-Year Post-Mission Disposal Rule), effective Sept. 29, 2024.

9 Christopher M. Maloney et al., Investigating the Potential Atmospheric Accumulation and Radiative Impact of the Coming Increase in Satellite Reentry Frequency, 130 J. Geophys. Res. Atmos. e2024JD042442, at 1 (2025), https://doi.org/10.1029/2024JD042442

10 J. P. Ferreira et al., Potential Ozone Depletion From Satellite Demise During Atmospheric Reentry in the Era of Mega-Constellations, 51 Geophys. Res. Lett. e2024GL109280 (2024) https://doi.org/10.1029/2024GL109280.

11 Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 8-10. SpaceX presents software modeling (DRAMA/3Demise) showing that all major subsystems (AI hardware, solar arrays, thermal systems, avionics, and thrusters) demise during reentry. Because no surviving fragment impacts the Earth with a kinetic energy exceeding 15 Joules (the standard NASA/FCC casualty threshold), SpaceX calculates its aggregate ground casualty risk probability as zero. It therefore claims the satellites “pose no risk to humans on the ground”; see Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 1.

12 Supra note 10, at 2. See also D.M. Murphy et al., Metals from spacecraft reentry in stratospheric aerosol particles, 120 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. e2313374120, at 1–4 (2023) https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2313374120 (confirming in-situ detection of spacecraft aluminum in 10% of stratospheric aerosol particles).

13 M.Y. Danilin et al., Global stratospheric effects of the alumina emissions by solid-fueled rocket motors, 106 J. Geophys. Res. Atmos. 12727–12738 (2001) https://doi.org/10.1029/2001JD900022 (establishing heterogeneous chlorine activation chemistry on alumina particle surfaces).

14 L. E. Revell et al., Near-future rocket launches could slow ozone recovery, npj Climate and Atmospheric Science. 8, 212 (2025) https://doi.org/10.1038/s41612-025-01098-6

15 Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 9 (Q. 10(f)).

16 Id.

17 Elsa Maishman, Space debris Australia: Piece of SpaceX capsule crashes to Earth in field, BBC News (August 3, 2022) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-62414438

18 Brett Tingley, NASA Confirms Space Debris in North Carolina Was From SpaceX Crew Dragon, Space.com (June 25, 2024), https://www.space.com/nasa-confirms-debris-spacex-crew-dragon (documenting carbon-composite hardware surviving reentry and impacting a mountain trail in Canton, N.C.).

19 Scott Larson, 2nd Piece of Space Junk Landed on Saskatchewan Farmland in 2024, CBC News (Apr. 6, 2025), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/2nd-piece-of-space-junk-landed-on-saskatchewan-farmland-in-2024-1.7502192 (reporting Starlink hardware and 40 kg rocket debris impacting farmland near Hodgeville and Ituna, Saskatchewan).

20 Shweta Sharma, SpaceX Rocket Debris Crash Lands Into Man's Lawn in Poland, The Independent (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.independent.co.uk/space/spacex-rocket-debris-lawn-crash-b2701496.html (documenting a 4-ton SpaceX stage from a Starlink mission making an uncontrolled reentry and crashing near Poznan, Poland).

21 William Savinar, Mexico to Pursue Legal Action Over Falling SpaceX Rocket Debris, Courthouse News Service (June 25, 2025), https://www.courthousenews.com/mexico-to-pursue-legal-action-over-falling-spacex-rocket-debris/ (reporting large structural fragments and 4,500-pound tanks washing ashore and impacting coastal areas in Tamaulipas, Mexico).

22 Jonathan McDowell, Dragon 2 Trunk reentries, planet4589.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2026) https://planet4589.org/space/misc/trunks.html

23 L. Scott, M. Fuller, & N. Young, The Axiom Mission 3 debris find in Ituna, Saskatchewan - Canadian Armed Forces lessons learned on re-entry processing. SpaceOps 462 (2025) https://doi.org/10.82217/spaceops2025_462.

24 To determine the maximum size of a compact fragment under the 15-Joule limit, we mathematically substituted the terminal velocity formula directly into the definition of kinetic energy. This leaves the object's mass and cross-sectional area as the only unknown variables. By modeling the surviving debris as a solid sphere, both mass and area can be expressed strictly as a function of the fragment's radius and material density. Adopting fixed constants for sea-level air density and Earth's gravity allows us to isolate and solve directly for that radius. For a common material like aluminum, this physical constraint strictly restricts the surviving fragment to a maximum diameter of 2.4 centimeters (cm) and a mass of 20.2 grams (g), ensuring its final impact velocity of 38.6 meters per second generates exactly 15 Joules of kinetic energy. For an aerodynamic titanium sphere, we find a maximum diameter of 1.9 cm and its mass to 15.6 g before its higher terminal velocity of 43.8 meters per second breaches the energy cap. Conversely, if a fragment survives as a flat, thin object (such as a 2-millimeter-thick aluminum panel), the increase in surface area creates significantly more air resistance relative to its weight. This slows the object to about 8.5 meters per second, implying a size of up to 28×28 cm and a mass of 416 g while still remaining under the 15-Joule threshold.

25 47 C.F.R. § 25.114(d)(14)(vii)(D)(2)(ii) (specifying a casualty risk of 0.0001 or less).

26 Confirmed: Strange Debris Found Around WNC Part of SpaceX Spacecraft, WLOS (June 20, 2024), https://wlos.com/news/local/strange-debris-part-spacex-spacecraft-nasa-confirms-space-junk-dragon-franklin-canton-haywood-county-north-carolina.

27 Selam Gebrekidan, A Ton of Space Junk Tumbles Unpredictably to Earth Every Week, N.Y. Times (July 31, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/31/world/asia/space-debris-falling-crashing-earth-risk.html.

28 Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 10 (Q. 10(h)).

29 SpaceX, Starlink Satellite Demisability (undated),https://starlink.com/public-files/Starlink_Approach_to_Satellite_Demisability.pdf

30 J. McDowell, Jonathan’s Space Report,https://planet4589.org/space/reentry/orl/ledger.rcat.tsv (last updated Sept. 18, 2026).

31 Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 1, 5 (citing Teledesic LLC, Order and Authorization, 14 FCC Rcd 2261, ¶ 14 (IB 1999) and 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 2.102(a), 2.106, 25.102, 25.114, 25.202 as authoritative).

32 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).

33 5 U.S.C. § 706.

34 CSE comment, supra note 3, at 4.

35 Id.

36 Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 8 (Q. 10(e)).

37 Ex parte response, supra note 1 at 11.

38 CSE Reply Comments, supra note 4, at 1-2.

39 Aaron C. Boley & Michael Byers, Satellite Mega-Constellations Create Risks in Low Earth Orbit, Atmosphere and the Earth's Climate, 11 Sci. Rep. 10642, at 3–5 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-89909-7 (demonstrating that operator claims regarding collision-free automated maneuvers only hold for cataloged objects and fail to account for untracked debris <10 cm transiting narrow constellation shells, where the probability of untracked debris hitting active satellites accumulates continuously).

40 Daniel Jang & Richard Linares, Simulating the Evolution of Lethal Nontrackable Population for Low-Earth-Orbit Sustainability, 63 J. Spacecr. Rockets (2026), https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/10.2514/1.A36198 (quantifying the “lethal non-trackable” (LNT) debris population (1-10 cm) and establishing that because terrestrial radar limits tracking to objects >10 cm, collision avoidance systems omit LNT debris, resulting in unmitigated, debilitating collisions across LEO mega-constellations).

41 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Process for Limiting Orbital Debris, NASA Technical Standard NASA-STD-8719.14C, at 22–26, 41–44 (2021), https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-8719.14 (specifying that collision risk assessments for active maneuvering satellites apply to objects 10 cm or larger and explicitly recognizing that objects below 10 cm cannot be actively avoided via conjunction assessment due to tracking network resolution limits).

42 H. Lewis, Critical Sizes of Satellite Constellations. arXiv:2607.29644 (2026) https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.29644.